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Abstract

THE INTERACTION OF MORAL IDENTITY AND RECOGNITION ON FUNDRAISING
BEHAVIOR
By: C. Otis Fulton, M.S.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Psychology at Virginia Commonwealth University
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2022.
Major Director: Dr. Jeffrey D. Green, Professor, Department of Psychology

The research examined the role of moral identity in motivating prosocial behavior, specifically
volunteer fundraising measured in dollars via Facebook fundraisers for the Spina Bifida
Association, a national nonprofit organization. I predicted a three-way interaction of moral
identity symbolization, internalization, and recognition (i.e., public acknowledgement of the gift
by the organization) to predict prosocial behavior. When moral identity internalization is low, I
hypothesized that high moral identity symbolization will motivate recognized prosocial behavior
due to the opportunity to have one’s prosocial behavior in a public venue. In contrast, when
moral identity internalization is high, prosocial behavior would be motivated regardless of the
level of symbolization and recognition. The main effect of recognition on fundraising was not
significant, nor were the predicted interactions regarding identity symbolization, internalization,
and recognition. Notably, empathy was significantly and positively associated with monies
raised.
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Introduction

We can be heroes, just for one day.
— David Bowie, Heroes

As with all behaviors, prosocial behaviors are influenced by dispositional and situational
factors to a greater or lesser degree. A review of the literature examining predictors of prosocial
behavior shows that they fall into the two broad categories that social and personality theorists
have emphasized for decades: individual-difference variables like dispositions, and contextual
variables, such as incentives and group norms. In general, research suggests that dispositional
variables are relatively weak predictors of prosocial behavior. However, Grant and Mayer (2009)
showed that dispositional prosocial and impression management motives reliably predict
prosocial behavior. Meanwhile, other studies have shown that prosocial behavior can be
predicted by individual differences like empathy (Joireman, Kamdar, Daniels, & Duell, 2006),
agreeableness, and conscientiousness (Ilies, Scott, & Judge, 2006), and other-orientation
(Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004). Still, the link between dispositional variables and prosocial
behavior is not consistent across studies (Organ & Ryan, 1995), suggesting that contextual
factors likely moderate their relationship.
Because prosocial behaviors are essential to the functioning and sustainability of
nonprofit organizations, understanding what motivates prosocial behaviors in an organizational
context is an important topic of inquiry. Research has shown that dispositional prosocial motives
reliably predict prosocial behaviors towards charitable organizations (Grant & Mayer, 2009). For
example, impression management motives strengthen associations between prosocial motives
and group citizenship by encouraging individuals to behave in ways that result in positive
outcomes for the organization, and the opportunity to be seen by others behaving in a prosocial
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manner. Other studies have shown that prosocial behaviors towards charitable organizations are
predicted by individual differences like empathy, agreeableness, conscientiousness and otherorientation (Ilies et al., 2006; Joireman et al., 2006; Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004). However, with
regards to nonprofit organizations, the link between dispositional variables and prosocial
behavior is not consistent, suggesting that many contextual factors moderate the relationship
(Organ & Ryan, 1995).
A growing body of research has explored the role that an individual’s “moral self” plays
in a range of prosocial behaviors, including charitable giving (Boegershausen, Aquino, & Reed,
2015). The moral self refers to the degree to which an individual’s moral self-schema is
paramount to their self-definition. Researchers refer to an individual’s moral identity to describe
the extent that the moral self-schema is central to an individual’s self-definition (Aquino & Reed,
2002). This is also sometimes referred to as one’s “moral identity centrality.” This research was
inspired by work that has examined the role that recognition of one’s prosocial behavior,
specifically making a charitable donation, plays in donation behavior (Winterich, Mittal, &
Aquino, 2013). This research differs from, and expands upon, previous research in two
significant ways. First, previous research has measured donation behavior in artificial manners.
For example, in one study, participants were entered into a lottery to win a $50 amazon.com gift
card, and asked if they would like to donate part, or all of a $50 amazon.com gift card to a
nonprofit organization if they won the card. Second, previous studies have used donors as
subjects of the research. This research looked at the prosocial behavior of volunteer fundraisers
(as opposed to donors) who were asked to do real fundraising for an actual nonprofit
organization using the Facebook fundraiser platform. Thus, this study not only analyzed
individuals’ fundraising behaviors in extant, not artificial, fundraising scenarios, but also
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associated the effects of aspects of moral identity, recognition, and their interaction on these
behaviors. These so-called “peer-to-peer” fundraisers (soliciting donations from friends) are
often called the “front door” of a nonprofit, (VanHuss & Fulton, 2017) because they result in
both enhanced revenue (compared to individual donors) but also provides the nonprofit with the
names and contact information of the donors to the fundraiser, most of whom are new to the
organization.
Literature Review
Motivations for Volunteerism
This research focused on volunteer fundraisers; psychologists who study why
people initially volunteer have focused on how the personality, needs of potential volunteers, and
the social situations they confront affect volunteering. For example, Davis et al. (1999) found an
association between dispositional empathy and willingness to engage in certain kinds of
volunteer activities. Penner and others (Mazzoni & Nelson, 1998; Penner & Finkelstein, 1998;
Penner, Midili, & Kegelmeyer, 1997) demonstrated that a cluster of personality dispositions
(which include empathy) plays a significant role in the decision to volunteer. How do individual
differences in background and personality actually translate into volunteering? Omoto and
Snyder (Omoto & Snyder, 1995) approached the question of how different people make the
decision to volunteer from a novel perspective. They argued that people decide to volunteer
because volunteering will serve some purpose or meet some need for them. Their functional
analysis of volunteering is based on the principle that much of human behavior is motivated by
goals and needs. Therefore, understanding why a person engages in a particular activity requires
identifying the function the activity serves or the need that was satisfied for that person. The
same behavior can serve different functions for different individuals or for the same individual at
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different times. Snyder explored people's motives for volunteering and developed an instrument
that assesses different volunteer motives. Clary et al. (1999) identified six motives for
volunteering: Values, to express values related to altruistic and humanitarian concerns for others;
Understanding, to acquire new learning experiences and/or use skills that otherwise are unused;
Social, to strengthen social relationships or engage in behaviors favored by important others;
Career, to gain career-related benefits; Protective, to reduce negative feelings about oneself or
address personal problems; and Enhancement, to grow and develop psychologically. Initiation of
volunteering depends on whether the person believes the act will meet one or more of these
needs and serve the intended functions. According to the theory, whether volunteer activity is
sustained depends on the extent to which the volunteering experience in fact satisfies the relevant
motive(s) for the individual. Many researchers find that volunteers say that they are most
motivated by value-based, other-oriented, or prosocial motives (Reed & Selbee, 2001). For
example, Penner and Finkelstein (1997) conducted a longitudinal study of motives of volunteers
at an AIDS service organization. They measured male volunteers' motives for volunteering at the
beginning of the study and found that the Values motive correlated most highly with the extent
of volunteer activity and with time spent with HIV-positive clients 10 months later. Similarly,
Clary & Orenstein (1991) also found that this altruistic or Value motivation was related to the
amount of help given by crisis-counseling volunteers. However, Snyder and others have
persuasively argued that sustained volunteering can also be motivated by other less selfless
motives, such as advancing one's career or developing social relationships (Clary & Mark, 1999).
Hart and his associates (2004) proposed a model that attempts to integrate both the sociological
and psychological approaches to volunteering. Using data from a national survey, they presented
evidence that both personality factors and social structures (e.g., family, culture) play important
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roles in the incidence of volunteering, but the relationship is not a direct one. Rather, these
factors affect things such as a person's attitudes, identity, commitment to ideals, and the richness
of the person's social networks. It is these latter factors that directly lead to volunteering.
Similarly, Wilson and Musick (1997) developed a model in which both volunteering and
informal helping are predicted from demographic variables, “human capital” (education, income,
functional health), “social capital” (number of children, social interaction patterns), and “cultural
capital” (religiosity and valuing helping). Omoto and Snyder (2002) also included
“considerations of community” in their modeling of volunteering. They argued that being part of
a community and identifying with it both can affect whether and for how long individuals choose
to volunteer.
Research has demonstrated that multiple personal, social, and organizational factors
affect people's initial decision to volunteer. The factors that determine the initial decision to
volunteer resemble those involved in spontaneous helping. Empathy, other-oriented and selforiented motivations, and the recognized needs of others all contribute to the initial decision to
volunteer. Volunteering is a long-term activity, and longitudinal studies of volunteers find that
once people decide to volunteer, a large percentage of them remain volunteers for several years
(Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005). This research proceeded under a similar
organizing principle – examining the effects of various moral identity characteristics on a
prosocial behavior – but the behavior in question was individuals’ creation of fundraising
platforms.
Theory of the Moral Self
Moral psychology is an area of study in both psychology and philosophy. Traditionally,
“moral psychology” is a term that referred to the study of moral development (Graham et al.,
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2011). The term has come to include a number of issues that include ethics, psychology and the
philosophy of mind (Russell & Doris, 2008). Plato and Aristotle's philosophical works described
the earliest study of moral psychology that focused on moral education (Carr, 2014). Psychology
and philosophy first diverged regarding moral judgment with the empirical work of F. C. Sharp
in the late nineteenth century and coincided with the more general development of psychology
separate from philosophy (Chapman, 1898). Since that time, both philosophers and psychologists
attempted to empirically gauge an individual’s moral sense, particularly focusing on
differentiating children from adults (Hartshorne & May, 1930). These early efforts proved
unsuccessful because they attempted to measure morality as an individual trait instead of an
individual’s psychological representation of morality (Wendorf, 2001).
Contemporary moral self research is based on the premise that morality is a characteristic
of a person and not simply a result of abstract moral reasoning (Blasi, 1999). Morality is
understood to be at the heart of what it means to be a person (Darcia & Daniel, 2004). The moral
self is concerned with the morality of selfhood (the qualities by virtue of which a person is
oneself) that implicates both who a person is (a person’s sense of self and identity based on
deeply felt concerns, commitments, and attachments) (Harter, 1999) and how a person acts (a
person’s characteristic ways of thinking, feeling, and regulating behavior). These ideas follow an
ontological tradition in moral philosophy and psychology, which posit that the self involves both
a private dimension rooted in the core of one’s being, and a public dimension manifested in an
orientation to be true to oneself in action (Erikson, 1964; James, 2011). Thus, moral self research
has focused on explaining (i) how morality is internalized into a person’s sense of self, the
“having” side of the moral self, and (ii) how that internalized morality influences cognitive and
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affective self-regulatory capacities that govern decisions and behavior, the “doing” side of the
moral self.
The “having” side of the moral self is cognitively and socially constructed (Harter, 1999).
Social construction occurs through roles, practices, and interpersonal interactions within the
social-moral context in which a person is embedded, such as family, community, or organization
(Hunter, 2000). Cognitive construction occurs through individuals’ beliefs about their self (i.e.,
self-concepts and identities) based on social interactions that bring meaning to their experiences
(Harter, 1999). When these socially and cognitively constructed beliefs are based on morality, a
person is understood as “having” a moral self.
The “doing” side underscores the executive agency of the self to take responsibility,
make decisions, initiate actions, and exert control over itself and the environment (Baumeister,
1998). Without this executive function, the moral self would be a “mere helpless spectator of
events, of minimal use or importance” (Baumeister, 1998). Cognitive and affective selfregulatory capacities are essential to agency, governing nearly all the self’s activities, especially
those concerning morality (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1993). As such, the “doing” side of
the moral self has been described as a self-regulatory mechanism that motivates moral action
(Aquino & Reed, 2002). In sum, this “having” and “doing” conceptualization of the moral self
implies that the moral self is not a standalone construct or variable but is a complex mix of moral
constructs and processes, wherein self-defining moral beliefs, orientations, and dispositions
implicate cognitive and affective self-regulatory capacities essential to moral action. This holistic
understanding reflects an emerging trend in both moral psychology (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004)
and self psychology more generally (Leary & Tangney, 2012).
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This study sought to correlate both such sides of the moral self – the “having”
component, internalizing morality into the sense of self via the presented ability to help raise
funds for a medical condition’s research and support, as well as the “doing” component, the
executive decision-making performed to engage in such prosocial fundraising behavior, or not.
Furthermore, this work examined how an external situational effect, recognition, interacts with
these components of the self.

Connecting Moral Theory with Moral Action
The question of why people act morally has been a subject of inquiry in psychology for
more than fifty years. Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral development provided a construct for
examining how moral reasoning influenced individuals’ behavior in hypothetical situations
(Kohlberg, 1984). Kohlberg’s model is based (in part) on Piaget’s theory of cognitive
development. Kohlberg assumed that moral principles would motivate individuals to behave
morally when understood. His model describes six stages of development of moral reasoning,
beginning with a focus on avoiding punishment by authorities (Stage 1) and ending with an
acceptance of a universal principle of justice and rights (Stage 6). The motivation for moral
action comes from moral understanding; the model largely discounted other facets of morality,
such as emotion.
Martin Hoffman outlined a theory focused on the role of moral emotion in morality
(Hoffman, 1970, 2001). In contrast to cognitive approaches, in Hoffman’s model, moral emotion
was seen to drive moral motivation. Specifically, “… abstract moral principles, learned in ‘cool’
didactic contexts (lectures, sermons), lack motive force. Empathy’s contribution to moral
principles is to transform them into prosocial hot cognitions – cognitive representations charged
with empathic affect, thus giving them motive force” (Hoffman, 2001, p. 239). Emotion provides
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the motivating ‘spark’ that leads to action. Moral understanding is seen as focusing and directing
moral emotion. Some other scholars also emphasize the role of emotion, although not to the
extent than does Hoffman, for example, Eisenberg (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987).
While Kohlberg’s theory was foundational, it was found to be limited because moral
reasoning alone is not a strong predictor of moral behavior (Blasi, 1980). Empirically, research
has generally shown moral reasoning (Blasi, 1980) and moral emotion (Eisenberg & Miller,
1987) to be only moderately positively associated with moral action. This weak and inconsistent
relationship between moral judgment and moral behavior is known as the “judgment–action gap”
(Frimer & Walker, 2008). Therefore, moral cognitive-emotional motives are not the only drivers
for moral action; significant unexplained variability in moral behavior remains. Given the
moderate relationship between moral reasoning and action, Blasi (1980) became skeptical of
Kohlberg’s notion that moral judgment is directly linked to moral action and advocated for
searching for potential moderating factors. The same can be said for the linkage between moral
emotion and moral action. It has been shown that moral cognitive-emotional sources of
motivation can spark moral action in some individuals in some situations. However, they cannot
by themselves account for extraordinary moral action, consistent moral behavior, and persistent
moral commitment. For these things, there may be moderating factors between moral cognitiveemotional motivation sources and moral action (Price Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007).
Blasi (1983) proposed the Self Model of moral functioning to fill the gap between moral
understanding and moral action left by Kohlberg’s theory. His model has three key components.
First, before leading to moral action, a moral judgment can also be considered within the context
of a judgment of personal responsibility, such that ‘an action, evaluated as moral, is also judged
to be strictly necessary for the individual’ (Blasi, 1983, p. 198). This suggests a person might not
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only decide what is the ‘right’ or ‘moral’ action in a given situation but might also assess
whether they feel responsible for taking action on that judgment. Second, the model stipulates
that the criteria for judgments of responsibility often originate from the structure of an
individual’s self. More specifically, Blasi first coined the term “moral identity” to reflect
individual differences in the extent to which being moral is a central characteristic of a person’s
sense of self. The third component of the Self Model is self-consistency. Blasi postulated that to
want to live in a way that is consistent with one’s sense of self is a natural human tendency.
Therefore, when one’s self is centered on moral concerns, this consistency bias serves as a key
motivating force for moral action. In summary, Blasi postulated that moral judgments might
more reliably predict moral behavior if they are 1) filtered through responsibility judgments
based on moral identity, and 2) spurred into action via the tendency toward self- consistency.
Additional work is needed to uncover plausible drivers of the significant gap between
moral understanding and moral action. In particular, research that manipulates a certain aspect of
the moral-behavioral pipeline, while allowing for measurement of other components of moral
identity, will permit analysis of the strength of both the manipulated and measured variables on
prosocial behavior.
Moral Psychology’s Resurgence
A renewed interest in moral psychology across many areas of psychology followed the
independent publication of two landmark papers by Jonathan Haidt (Haidt, 2001) and Joshua
Greene and colleagues (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). The focus
shifted away from developmental processes emphasized by Kohlberg and others to an emphasis
on social, cognitive, affective, and neural processes that contribute to moral judgements. Moral
Foundations Theory, proposed by Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph in 2004, is a construct that
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explains the variation in moral reasoning in terms of innate, modular foundations (Haidt &
Joseph, 2004). Later, Moral Foundations Theory would be used to differentiate between the
moral foundations of (political) liberals and conservatives (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Moral
Foundations Theory expands on the earlier Three Ethics Theory, which outlined three moral
ethics: community, autonomy, and divinity. Haidt and Graham expanded Three Ethics Theory
into five cognitive systems. Calling them the Five Foundations of Morality, they postulated that
each varies in importance depending on culture. The five psychological foundations are:
1) Harm/care: The sensitivity to signs of suffering in offspring that develops into a general
dislike of seeing suffering in others and the potential to feel compassion as a response.
2) Fairness/reciprocity: Developed when someone observes or engages in reciprocal
interactions. (This foundation is concerned with virtues related to fairness and justice.)
3) Ingroup/loyalty: Recognizing, trusting, and cooperating with members of one's ingroup
as well as being wary of members of other groups.
4) Authority/respect: The way an individual navigates in hierarchical groups and
communities.
5) Purity/sanctity: The emotion of disgust that guards the body by responding to stimuli that
are biologically or culturally linked to disease transmission.
When applied to political liberals and conservatives, Haidt and Craig found that liberals
value harm/care and fairness/reciprocity more than the other three moral foundations, while
conservatives value all five foundations equally. Developed from the Five Foundations of
Morality theory, the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011). The survey
measures the five moral intuitions. Test-takers rate considerations with regards to their relevancy
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to their own moral judgements. The instrument measures the degree to which the individual
relies on the five moral foundations in making judgements.
Published concurrently in 2001, independently of the work of Haidt, Joshua Greene and
colleagues released the study, “An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral
Judgement” (Greene et al., 2001). This research challenged the emphasis of moral psychology on
reason in making moral judgments, applying “the methods of cognitive neuroscience to the study
of moral judgement.” Researchers examined the nature of the interaction of reason and emotion,
their neural correlates, and the factors that moderate the influence of reason and emotion on
moral judgements. They argued that moral dilemmas vary systematically in the way they engage
emotional processing, and that these systematic variations influence an individual’s moral
judgements.
A recent synthesis, called the “science of moral understanding,” draws from intergroup
conflict as well as moral psychology, attempts to describe how moral judgments divide
individuals and provide a way to bridge moral divides (Gray & Graham, 2018). Earlier research
(Haidt & Graham, 2007) describes liberals and conservatives as having fundamentally different
moral minds, but by focusing on the differences between political opponents, this research is
thought to have overlooked what principles on which liberals and conservatives agree with
regards to morality. Gray’s research suggests rather that people have one consistent moral mind
that is grounded in perceptions of harm. In this conceptualization, liberals and conservatives
agree about morality being about harm but diverge concerning what is harmful. For example,
there is common agreement that things like murder, theft, and fraud are wrong. And when each
side begins associating someone’s behavior with harm, those behaviors are seen as intrinsically
immoral. Perspectives found in the science of moral understanding is consistent with Blasi’s
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analysis (1984) which showed, “even though there may be several non-overlapping moral traits
that compose each unique person’s moral identity, there exists a set of common moral traits
likely to be important to most people’s moral self-definitions.” (Aquino & Reed, 2002, p. 1424).
Using longitudinal studies, researchers (Cohen & Morse, 2014) have described the stable
traits that moral people exhibit. In general, they can be described as sincere, modest, fair, and
disciplined, prudent, and organized. In addition, they are good at resisting temptations (i.e., they
exhibit high self-control) and thinking about the future consequences of their behavior (i.e., they
exhibit a high consideration of future consequences). Finally, integrity is important to them, and
they want to see themselves as possessing moral traits.
Aspects of Haight and Graham’s Five Foundations of Morality, as well as traits that are
exhibited by moral people (Cohen et al., 2014) can be expressed and organized as an individual’s
“moral identity.” Moral identity has been defined in a range of different ways by psychologists.
Given the salience of moral identity to increasing charitable giving in a range of published
research, and in order to justify the use of measures in this study, I will next review
psychologists’ different conceptualizations of moral identity as a trait that influences prosocial
behavior.
Moral Identity
The concept of moral identity emerged in the social sciences literature over four decades
ago, largely spurred by Blasi’s (Blasi, 1980; 1983; 1984) work in the early 1980s. Blasi’s
analysis (1984) shows that “even though there may be several non-overlapping moral traits that
compose each unique person’s moral identity, a set of common moral traits are likely to be
important to most people’s moral self-definitions.” (Aquino & Reed, 2002, p.1424). More recent
research has focused on using the concept of moral identity to examine the relationship between
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moral judgement and moral actions. More recent researchers have defined moral identity as “the
degree to which being a moral person is important to an individual’s identity” (Hardy & Carlo,
2005). Those individuals who believe that moral values (e.g., honesty, compassion, fairness,
generosity, etc.) are central to defining their personal identity are said to have a strong moral
identity. Research has shown that individuals appear to construct moral identities for themselves
and that internalizing one’s moral identity can influence moral action (Krettenauer, Murua, &
Jia, 2016). Research has demonstrated that small cues (such as “primes”) can alter which facet of
an individual’s identity (e.g., as a patriot, as a parent, as a Black man) is salient at a given point
in time (Bargh, 2006). Priming identities that individuals perceive as more self-relevant has been
shown in past research to be more impactful (Leboeuf, Shafir, & Bayuk, 2010). The malleability
of identity, and the fact that different facets of identity can be brought to the surface by different
cues, helps distinguish the effects of identity from underlying preferences.
Aquino and Reed’s Self-Importance of Moral Identity Questionnaire. Since its
publication, the majority of empirical moral identity research has utilized Aquino and Reed’s
(2002) Self-Importance of Moral Identity Questionnaire (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016). The
measure presents a list of nine attributes that characterize a highly moral person: caring,
compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind. The authors
argue that “to measure moral identity, it should not be necessary, in principle, to discover the
entire universe of traits that might compose a person’s unique moral identity. Rather, all that is
needed to invoke and subsequently measure the self-importance of a person’s moral identity is to
activate a subset of moral traits that are linked to other moral traits that may be more central to a
particular person’s self-concept.” Through a series of several different studies, Aquino and Reed
(2002) created a 10-item questionnaire for assessing moral identity in adults. This self-report
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paper-and-pencil measure involves (1) presenting participants with a list of nine moral traits, (2)
asking them to visualize a person with those traits (their self or someone else) and how that
person would think, feel, and act, and (3) having them rate statements such as, ‘It would make
me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics.’ Based on the properties of identity
outlined by Erikson, (1964), Aquino and Reed (2002) developed and validated two 5-item
subscales, one to indicate ‘the respondent’s actions in the world’ (labeled symbolization) and
another to tap ‘the degree to which the moral traits are central to the self-concept’ (labeled
internalization). The questionnaire renders “moral identity centrality,” the extent to which moral
identity is central to a person’s self-concept, (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009)
which differs across individuals. High moral identity centrality has been shown to elicit moral
behavior more consistently (Aquino, McFerran, & Laven, 2011).
A large body of research has explored how moral centrality and being a moral person are
related to one’s self-concept. Although a number of constructs and labels for moral centrality
have emerged (e.g., moral identity and moral self-concept), each involve the degree to which
moral qualities, concerns, commitments, or goals are significant definitional components of the
self. Much of this literature on moral centrality (approximately 70 percent of the empirical work)
has adopted Aquino and Reed’s (2002) concept of moral identity, defined as “a self-conception
organized around a set of moral traits.” The internalization and symbolization dimensions align
with the “having” side of the moral self and the “doing” side of the moral self (respectively)
mentioned previously here.
Aquino and Reed describe moral identity as an associative network of related moral
traits, goals and behaviors that make up an individual’s schema of their moral character. Their
framework explains the everyday, more automatic, less reflective moral behaviors that
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individuals engage in. A person with a highly internalized moral identity is someone for whom
this network of morally relevant knowledge is accessible faster, and in greater quantity, within
the person’s working self-concept. As a result, their moral identity is more central to their overall
identity (Aquino et al., 2009). Someone who is high in moral identity internalization will bring
these cognitively accessible moral trait associations to mind more consistently, quickly, and
more easily than an individual who is low in internalization. The two dimensions of moral
identity correspond to different motivations for prosocial behavior. Research has shown that the
internalization dimension is a more reliable predictor of prosocial behavior than is the
symbolization dimension (Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008). Someone who is high in moral
identity symbolization tends to engage in socially observable behaviors that communicate their
commitment to some moral goals or ideals. They will be more likely to convey their moral
identity in a public manner, externally, via their actions, and less likely to act privately on their
moral identity. Someone who is low in this dimension is less likely to engage in these public
behaviors. People who are high in moral identity are motivated to engage in prosocial behaviors
to maintain self-consistency; they engage in prosocial behaviors because it is consistent with
their concept of what it means to be a moral individual. People who are high in moral identity
internalization are motivated to behave in a prosocial manner regardless of the private or public
nature of their actions because moral schema are more accessible to them in working memory
(Blasi, 1980). For these individuals, failure to act in a prosocial manner would result in a state of
dissonance between the way they view themselves (as moral individuals) and how they should
behave.
Moral identity shows considerable promise as a predictor of prosocial behavior, including
toward nonprofit organizations. There is evidence which shows that moral identity predicts
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various types of prosocial behavior across many situations (see a review by Shao, Aquino, &
Freeman, (2008)). According to moral identity theory, motivation to show concern for others is
likely to be felt most strongly by people whose moral identity is highly relevant to their sense of
self (Reed & Aquino, 2003). There is a correspondence between an individual’s concept of what
it means to be a moral person and personality traits that predict prosocial behavior, like being
caring, compassionate and helpful (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Research suggests that people who
are high in moral identity internalization are more likely to have a stronger motivation to behave
in a prosocial manner with regards to nonprofit organizations than are those who are low in
moral identify internalization. Aquino and Reed (2002) tested the effect of internalized and
symbolic moral identity on the donation of food. They found that only internalized moral identity
predicted such giving, not symbolic moral identity. For every unit increase in internalized moral
identity, the odds of donating cans increased by eighty percent. The only conditions under which
symbolic moral identity made a difference is when internalized moral identity was low. In those
situations, people donated more when their symbolic moral identity is high and when public
recognition is offered (Winterich et al., 2013).
Research initially tended to focus on the internalization dimension (Aquino et al., 2009)
or consider additive effects of internalization and symbolization (Skarlicki, Van Jaarsveld, &
Walker, 2008). There are sound theoretical reasons for doing so, as the two dimensions are
positively correlated, ranging from .13 to .17 (Winterich, et al., 2013; Aquino & Reed, 2002).
Winterich and colleagues (2013) demonstrated empirically that the predictive power of these two
dimensions can be enhanced by treating them as having joint (interactive) effects, at least when
the dependent variable is recognized prosocial behavior. This research also demonstrated how
the contextual variable of recognition “may act as a moderator of the effect of symbolization on
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prosocial behavior.” It provided insight regarding the joint effect of symbolization and
internalization by demonstrating that the effect of symbolization is dependent on an individual’s
level of internalization. Specifically, the effect of symbolization on the study’s dependent
variable (charitable donations) declined as internalization increases, an interactive effect.
Research showed that symbolization does not generally provide any further motivation for
prosocial behavior beyond that which is provided by moral identity internalization. However,
symbolization does increase charitable donations for those low in internalization, provided that
the behavior is anticipated to be recognized.
Empathy and Prosocial Behavior
Research has focused on a range of emotions (such as guilt, sadness, distress, and
concern) that motivate helping and altruism in humans. Moral emotions (e.g., guilt, shame,
empathy; Tangney et al., 2007) often exert stronger influences on moral actions than moral
judgment (Jennings, Mitchell, & Hannah, 2015). Empathy, defined as understanding and
vicariously experiencing others’ emotions (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Knight, 2015). Empathy
plays a fundamental role in moral functioning (Eisenberg, 2000). According to Davis (1983),
empathy contains two cognitive components, namely perspective taking (PT, spontaneously
understanding other people’s point of views) and fantasy (FS, imaginatively understanding the
feelings of fictional characters in books or movies), and two emotional components, namely
empathic concern (EC, an other-oriented feeling of sympathy or concern for the misfortune of
others) and personal distress (PD, a self-oriented feeling of discomfort and uneasy when
witnessing others in need). Higher scores on empathy indicate better abilities in understanding
and experiencing other people’s mental states, and greater sensitivity to their needs (Masten,
Morelli, & Eisenberger, 2011). Other oriented empathic responses (e.g., EC) elicit behaviors
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aiming at reducing the distress of the victims, thus are more strongly associated with prosocial
engagement. However, self-oriented responses (e.g., PD) are more likely to reduce
uncomfortable feelings of the witness, leading to avoidance responses if able to do so (Habashi,
Graziano, & Hoover, 2016; Leiberg, Klimecki, & Singer, 2011). Empathy has also been shown
to facilitate OPB. In an online environment, empathic individuals show greater willingness to
share, help, and donate (Farrelly & Bennett, 2018; Khang & Jeong, 2016).
The capacity to experience sympathetic emotions in response to another person's problem
or distress has been identified as the key element linking personal predispositions to immediate
action (Cunningham, 1986). In particular, empathy has been shown to have important
implications for helping and altruism in humans. There are two major reasons why empathy has
attracted so much interest as a possible link between personal dispositions and altruistic actions.
The first is that there is a substantial relationship between the ability to experience empathy and
willingness to engage in prosocial behaviors. For example, Nancy Eisenberg and her associates
(Zhou et al., 2002) reported that the more empathic children were, the more likely they were to
behave in a prosocial manner. A similar relationship is found among adults: Empathy plays a
critical role in adults' decisions to offer or not to offer help (Davis, 1994). Thus, across a wide
range of people and situations, empathy is a critical element in helping. That said, to date there
has been no research relating empathy and moral identity. A number of recent studies have
examined the interaction of both on prosocial behavior concurrently, (Jiao, Wang, &
Maheswaran, 2018; Leng, Sun, Ma, Zhang, & Guo, 2020) but the exact relationship between the
two has yet to be investigated.
The most widely used measure of trait empathy is the Interpersonal Reactivity Index
(IRI) (Davis, 1983). The IRI consists of 28 items that are evenly divided into four subscales, with
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seven items per subscale. The subscales are “Fantasy,” the extent to which subjects identify
themselves with fictional characters, “Perspective-taking,” a type of empathy that is assessed by
how quickly another’s point of view if adopted, “Empathic concern,” an assessment of an
individual’s level of care and compassion for others, and finally “Personal distress,” which
assesses an individual’s level of discomfort and anxiety in response to the suffering of another.
When time constraints are absent, or when researchers wish to examine different dimensions of
empathy, the IRI is often selected. However, such an instrument did not lend itself well for the
current study, which captured volunteer subject data in a necessarily brief online survey. Here,
the need to keep the online experience for subjects as short as possible was important to prevent
subjects from dropping out before they completed the survey.
For this reason, the Single Item Trait Empathy scale (SITES) was employed this research.
The SITES consists of this single item: To what extent does the following statement describe
you: "I am an empathetic person," rated using a scale that ranges from 1=Not very true of me to
5=Very true of me. Taking only seconds to complete, the SITES is a trait measure of empathy,
meaning it assesses the degree to which individuals’ empathic responses to others varies across
situations (Konrath, Meier, & Bushman, 2018). The SITES is positively correlated with the IRI
and has been demonstrated to be consistent over time with test-retest correlations from 2 weeks
to 6 months greater than .55 and predicted prosocial behavior in a sample of adults.
Recognition of Nonprofit Supporters
Winterich and colleagues demonstrated that moral identity symbolization does increase
charitable donations for those low in moral identity internalization, provided that the behavior is
anticipated to be recognized (Winterich, et al., 2013). This research examined this relationship in
the context of volunteer fundraisers, instead of individuals who make direct charitable
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contributions. Prior to this study, no research to date examines the interaction of recognition and
moral identity on volunteer fundraising.
Recognition of donors is an accepted practice in the nonprofit industry to encourage
charitable giving and/or the donation of time (Moore, 2008). There are for-profit organizations
that assist nonprofits to create and execute recognition programs for the supporters (VanHuss &
Fulton, 2017). Recognition has been described as “an expression of appreciation given by a
group of individuals who undertake desired behaviors (Fisher & Ackerman, 1998). Recognition
of donors can be expressed publicly in a variety of ways, for example, granting “naming” rights
for buildings and programs, (Harbaugh, 1998) publishing donors’ names in newsletters, (Kotler,
2005) and bestowing donors with pink ribbons for their support of cancer research (Moore,
2008). Here I will define recognition as the knowledge by the supporter that their behavior either
receives or will receive attention in a public manner. Although many nonprofits provide
recognition to all supporters, research on the effectiveness of recognition has been equivocal
(Wymer, 2001). For example, some supporters avoid recognition as a means of avoiding future
solicitations on the part of the nonprofit, for religious (e.g., humility) reasons, or because donors
do not want the nonprofit to use its funds for recognition. However, in a 2017 study of eightythree fundraising programs conducted by thirty-three U.S. nonprofit organizations, there was an
overall redemption rate for recognition gifts of 50.1% among recognition earners. In ninety-eight
percent of the fundraising programs, those who accepted recognition raised more, on average,
than recognition decliners (VanHuss & Fulton, 2017).
The lack of clarity regarding the effect of recognition on prosocial behavior for nonprofit
organizations motivated this research, which sought to provide a greater understanding of how
recognition might interact with moral identity to predict prosocial behavior, specifically
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volunteer fundraising. To date, most research on prosocial behavior with regards to nonprofit
organizations has focused on donors. This research focused instead on volunteer fundraisers for
so-called “peer-to-peer” programs, which raised $1.6B for the top 30 programs in the U.S. in
2018. With regards to building a base of donors, nonprofits focus a great deal of time and energy
on the acquisition of new supporters. Peer-to-peer fundraising not only provides the short-term
benefit of revenue, but it also gives the nonprofit a list of names (the donors recruited by the
peer-to-peer fundraiser) that can be tapped for future support. It is the most successful “foot in
the door” technique that is utilized by nonprofit groups (Cialdini, 1993) and is often described as
the “front door” of the nonprofit organization.
Facebook Fundraisers
Nonprofit professionals were skeptical when, in 2015, Facebook announced that users of
the platform could fundraise on Facebook for their favorite charities (Hessekiel, 2019). One fear
was that Facebook would represent a barrier between the organizations and their donors because
of the difficulty in collecting contact information and other data about the supporters. However,
with more than one billion dollars a year being raised each year since 2018, Facebook
fundraising has transformed peer-to-peer fundraising. The success of Facebook fundraisers
mirrors the success of the platform more generally. Facebook fundraisers provide donors with a
social setting, manageable giving levels, and a platform that is already connected to their bank or
credit card. There are no fees to the nonprofit incurred by fundraising on the platform. Facebook
treats fundraisers like any other source of marketing data that they collect on those users starting
fundraisers and those users who donate.
A Facebook fundraiser involves nonprofit supporters raising donations directly through
the Facebook platform. This is done by sharing images and information about their personal
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connection to the cause and encouraging their friends and family members to give. These
fundraisers can be started at any time, whether associated with birthdays or after spontaneous
inspiration. When done well, it’s a no-fee, convenient, and fulfilling way to give to nonprofit
organizations. The process begins with a donor creating a fundraiser on Facebook. They share it
with their Facebook “friends” far and wide—whether created in association with their birthday
or not. Then, their friends, family members, and general network donate in support. However,
these donations don’t flow directly to the nonprofit like a typical donation might. If a nonprofit
isn’t registered with Facebook Payments, fundraisers set up in the nonprofit’s honor will be
associated with Network for Good. This is a donor-advised fund (DAF), a specialized type of
philanthropic savings account that can collect interest.
There is great incentive for nonprofits to register with Facebook and avoid having funds
raised on their behalf going through Network for Good. Facebook fundraisers handled via
Network for Good follow a predetermined set of steps that take significantly longer than direct
donations. These steps are as follows: (i) A user makes a donation. (ii) The donor immediately
receives the maximum tax deduction allowed by the IRS. (iii) Their donation is placed into the
DAF, where it can be invested and grown tax-free. (iv) Facebook directs this donation out of the
DAF toward the beneficiary selected by the donor (the nonprofit). These steps can (and will)
occur without the nonprofit’s interaction in the process at all. However, by taking hold of
Facebook fundraisers and optimizing the process, nonprofits can raise significantly more money,
typically in a significantly shorter period of time.
Still, there are a variety of reasons why organizations resist Facebook fundraisers.
On the front end, Facebook fundraisers can be confusing, hard to manage, and without easy
access to donors or fundraisers. The most common complaints about the process are as follows:
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(a) Nonprofits don’t know how to find, track, encourage, and thank new fundraisers. (b)
Nonprofits don’t know how to find and thank new donors. (c) The data provided by Facebook is
difficult to understand. (d) There is a loss of brand control and protection. (e) It can take months
to receive funding from Network for Good, Facebook’s DAF. These complaints have led to more
than one organization issuing statements on their Facebook pages, encouraging donors to give
directly through their website rather than through the platform. Even more common are
nonprofits simply ignoring the process— which may still result in funding, but certainly not as
much as if the platform was optimized.
The selection of Facebook fundraisers as the source of the dependent variable for this
study is notable. Other avenues to measure volunteer fundraising are available and are in fact
simpler to utilize, since Facebook’s lack of transparency forced me to use a third-party company
for data collection tools as described in the Dependent Variables section (below). Much of the
significance of this study derived from collecting data on the most important single platform in
the volunteer fundraising sphere: Facebook, which means that the findings have significant
ecological validity. The combination of ease of fundraiser creation for study participants with the
sheer scale of Facebook’s fundraising visibility lent the study particular relevance and
applicability.
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Overview of Study
This research examined the role of moral identity symbolization and internalization in
motivating prosocial behaviors, specifically fundraising for a nonprofit organization. The study
employed a 2 (Condition: Recognition vs. Control) X Continuous (Moral Identity Symbolization;
MI-S) X Continuous (Moral Identity Internalization; MI-I) mixed-methods design.
I hypothesized a three-way interaction of moral identity symbolization, internalization,
and recognition to predict prosocial behavior. Specifically, I predicted that the effect of moral
identity symbolization and internalization on prosocial behavior would depend on the amount of
recognition the fundraiser expects to attain. When moral identity internalization is low, I
hypothesized that high moral identity symbolization would motivate recognized prosocial
behavior due to the opportunity to present one’s moral characteristics to others. In contrast, when
moral identity internalization is high, prosocial behavior would be motivated irrespective of the
level of symbolization and recognition. The pattern of expected results is shown in the table
below. Note that the scale represents relative fundraising amounts across groups, not actual
monies raised.
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Table 1.
Expected means on a general 1-10 scale; “10” represents most successful fundraisers.

My expected results provide a framework for predicting prosocial behavior by combining
the two dimensions of moral identity with the situational factor of recognition. Because
recognition makes fundraising behaviors more publicly visible, it functions as a symbolic reward
(Grant, 2012).
Hypotheses
Below are the set of hypotheses for the study. The first three hypotheses concern amount
of money fundraised; the fourth and fifth hypotheses concern the likelihood of starting a
fundraiser; and the sixth and final hypothesis is an exploratory analysis of the effect of
controlling for perceived empathy. Interaction effect hypotheses are listed before lower-order
(main) effect hypotheses since the former effects would be of greatest importance if found to be
significant. This is because a presence of such interaction(s) would have the greatest explanatory
value in characterizing the outcomes of individuals’ Facebook fundraisers.
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H1: I predicted a positive three-way interaction between recognition, internalization and
symbolization. Specifically, the effect of internalization and symbolization on monies
raised will vary between the two levels of recognition (recognition versus control). (This
effect can be visualized in Table 1. In the control group, the fundraising amount response
variable is expected to increase slightly for individuals high in symbolization, but the
overall success of the fundraiser is not expected to be much. In the recognition group,
however, the effect of high symbolization was expected to be large for those individuals
who are high in internalization and even larger for those who are low in internalization.)

•

H2: I predicted a positive two-way interaction between recognition and symbolization. In
this way, those who are high in symbolization and are in the recognition group would
raise more money than those in the control group, regardless of their level of
symbolization. (Additionally, I did not predict significant two-way interactions between
internalization and symbolization, owing to the posited three-way interaction, or between
recognition and internalization.)

•

H3a: I predicted a positive correlation between symbolization and monies raised,
regardless of recognition or internalization status (i.e., main effect for symbolization)

•

H3b: I predicted that participants in the recognition group would raise significantly more
money than those in the control group, regardless of internalization or symbolization
status (i.e., main effect for recognition)

•

H4: I predicted that participants in the recognition group would be significantly more
likely to begin a successful fundraising page than those in the control group (i.e., main
effect for recognition)
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H5: I predicted a positive three-way interaction between recognition, internalization, and
symbolization on the likelihood of beginning a successful fundraising page.

•

H6: I conducted an exploratory analysis that adds the Single Item Trait Empathy Scale
(SITES) to the above regression model as a main effect. In this analysis, I predicted that
the three-way interaction term will remain significant after controlling for empathy, as
measured by SITES, in the model. Specifically, after controlling for perceived empathy,
moral identity would be significantly associated with amount fundraised, and the
magnitude of this effect would vary based on recognition group.
Methods

Participants
For this study, 311 subjects were recruited via email from the constituents of the Spina
Bifida Association, (SBA) a national nonprofit that supports treatment and research to cure spina
bifida (see Appendix 2 for solicitation email). A power analysis was performed incorporating
simulation of expected means and standard deviations of outcomes among the different possible
levels of the experimental variables. Specifically, the analysis was designed to detect, with 1β=80% power and α=0.05 false positive rate, a significant three-way interaction between
recognition group, internalization, and symbolization on amount of money fundraised.
Participants were randomized equally in simulations. Specifically, a total sample size of 136
participants was found to have adequate power to detect the interaction effect in the simulations.
Owing to potential missingness, outliers, or other issues with responses, the target was to recruit
at least 150 participants to this study.
Emails advertising participation in this study were sent to the entirety of the Spina Bifida
Association’s email list (23,021 email addresses). Of these, 5,572 members opened the email,

INTERACTION OF MI AND RECOGNITION ON FUNDRAISING

29

546 members filled out one of the two questionnaires, and 311 members provided complete and
usable data for the study. The sample decreased in size due to those subjects not completing their
names, an item which came at the end of the questionnaire. Without the subject’s name there was
no way to track whether they began a successful Facebook fundraiser (one that raised a
minimum of one dollar).
Procedure
Aquino and Reed’s (2002) Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale, or MIS (see
Appendix 1) was administered to assess characteristics of participants’ moral identity. The MIS
consists of items that measure two factors relating to moral identity. There are 5 questions that
correspond to each. Questions are on a 7-point Likert scale with anchors strongly disagree and
strongly agree. The internalization scale is a measure of the extent to which one values moral
traits or considers them central to one’s identity. The symbolization scale seeks to identify
whether one’s actions represent moral self-expression or commitment (e.g., group membership,
activities that are considered to be moral). Taking the MIS, participants were initially asked to
review nine characteristics that may exemplify an individual who is inclined to behave in a moral
fashion. Then a visualization task is undertaken in which participants are asked to imagine how a
person with these traits would feel, act, and think. Finally, participants answered each of the ten
items. An example of a question from the internalization scale is, ‘‘It would make me feel good
to be a person who has these characteristics.’’ An example of a question from the symbolization
scale is, ‘‘I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these
characteristics’’ (Aquino & Reed, 2002, p. 1428). Overall, both the internalization (Cronbach’s α
= .83) and symbolization (Cronbach’s α = .82) scales of the MIS have had high internal
consistency reliability coefficients in past work (Aquino & Reed, 2002).
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All participants were contacted via email sent from the Spina Bifida Association asking
them to participate in a study that would allow the organization “to learn more about the
supporters who make up our community.” The email was sent in November of 2021. This
timeframe was selected because it came after the organization’s fall fundraising campaign and
before their end-of-the-year fundraising campaign. Those agreeing to participate clicked a link in
the email that took them to a page hosting the survey items. In addition to completing SelfImportance of Moral Identity Scale, participants were also asked to complete the Single Item
Trait Empathy scale (SITES) and provide key demographic information, including their email,
age, gender, and “mission connection,” e.g., spina bifida patient, immediate family member of a
spina bifida patient, friend of a family with a spina bifida patient, and other (see Appendix 4).
After completing the Scale and demographic information, the participants were offered the
opportunity to set up a Facebook fundraiser that will benefit the Spina Bifida Association.
Setting up the page was relatively effortless; subjects were provided with a link that leads
directly to the organization’s Facebook fundraiser setup page.
The non-Recognition group received no additional information. The Recognition group
was also told that everyone who sets up a Facebook fundraiser would have their names and
Facebook link displayed on the organization’s “Champions for Spina Bifida” website. By
tagging them in this way, their Facebook followers would be aware of their participation. In
addition to the background information both groups provided, they were also asked to complete a
manipulation check question assessing the desirability of this form of recognition (e.g., “if you
set up a Facebook fundraiser for a charitable organization, how much would you enjoy being
“tagged” on the charity’s Facebook page as a form of thanks?”). The manipulation that was
selected is consistent with recognition being “an expression of appreciation given by a group to
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individuals who undertake desired behaviors” (Fisher & Ackerman, 1998). The inclusion of
supporters in public lists is a common practice among nonprofit groups.
Dependent Variables
The study examined two main dependent variables. The first was a dichotomous variable:
setting up a Facebook fundraiser (yes/no) and raising some amount of money. The other was a
continuous variable: the total amount of money raised by the participant within fifteen days (the
default time limit for a Facebook fundraiser). Collecting data from Facebook can be difficult;
Facebook began Facebook fundraisers as another type of data collection tool regarding
individual’s philanthropic interests that could be sold to advertisers and other groups, including
nonprofit organizations. Data was collected for this study by a business partner of Facebook that
owns a proprietary method to monitor and extract data from Facebook fundraisers and interact
with fundraisers via the Messenger application. There was one limitation in their data collection
capability – it was not able to detect Facebook fundraisers which were started but raised no
money. As a result, I was unable to detect what are known in the nonprofit world as “zero-dollar
fundraisers,” only those raising one dollar or more.
One moderating factor that is sometimes controlled for in research on charitable giving is
family income. The average Facebook fundraiser generates 7.4 donations from friends and
family; the average donation size is $31 (Peyrot, 2019). The number of donations per fundraiser
and the average size of those donations is relatively consistent across different nonprofit sectors
(e.g., environment, health, poverty, etc.). Because of the fairly modest size of the average
donation, family income was not a concern regarding this research.
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Results
The characteristics of my sample are summarized in Table 2. Of the participants
providing complete data, 164 (53%) set up a Facebook fundraiser that raised a dollar or more.
Forty-three percent of the sample was aged 50 or older, and 75 percent was female. Notably, 52
percent of the sample had been diagnosed with spina bifida themselves, and another 32 percent
had an immediate family member diagnosed, so almost all those who participated had a strong
personal link to this particular disease. The number of unique donors was similar for fundraisers
in the control group (M = 4.69, IQR = [2,6]) and recognition group (M = 4.38, IQR = [1,5]). A
typical fundraiser from participants in the control group raised more money (median $112.50)
than from participants in the control group (median $70.00).
Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics by Recognition Group.
Group
N
Started
Number Donors
Fundraiser
Count (%) Mean Median IQR

Total Raised
Mean

Median

IQR

Control

133

74 (56%)

4.69

4.00

(2,6)

197.80

112.50

(52.50, 250.0)

Recognition

178

90 (51%)

4.38

3.00

(1,5)

227.30

70.0

(30.0, 210.0)

In addition to the 311 participants described above, some respondents to the email
solicitation completed the questionnaire up to the point of providing their name and email
address but did not provide this identifying information. This made it impossible to track any
Facebook fundraising they may have done. There is a possibility that these individuals could
have been different than those participants who did provide their names and emails. If these
groups differed with respect to moral identity measures of internalization and symbolization, bias
could result in my estimates of the effects of these measures on fundraising. To assess whether
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such bias occurred, I performed an additional analysis where I compared the overall
internalization and symbolization scores between participants who did and did not provide their
names and email addresses. I compared these groups with independent-samples t-tests. A
summary of this analysis is given in Table 3. I provide the means and standard deviations of the
scores for the measures, as well as the results of the test comparing them. For both measures, the
differences in scores between those participants who did and did not provide their names and
email addresses did not significantly differ (p = 0.45 for internalization and p = 0.78 for
symbolization). Therefore, it is unlikely that these participants differed systematically from those
who did provide identifying information.
Table 3.1
Summary of moral identity measures for participants who did and did not provide names and
email addresses in the questionnaire.
Measure
Provide Names/Emails?
TDegrees of
P-value
statistic
freedom
Yes
No
Internalization

33.20 (2.26)*

33.50 (1.87)

0.76

145

0.45

Symbolization

26.85 (3.60)

27.00 (3.21)

0.28

135

0.78

* Mean and standard deviation for measure

Each of the experimental groups had a small number of positive outliers resulting from a
high-dollar fundraiser, skewing the data positively. For this reason, in all analyses, I performed a
logarithmic transformation on the monies raised variable to make the distribution of the variable

1

Of the 80 individuals who did not provide their names and emails, most also did not provide demographic
information that followed the name and email questions in the survey: age, gender, and relationship to Spina Bifida,
making it impossible to make comparisons on these demographics to the 311 participants who did provide this
information.
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more normally distributed, to satisfy the assumptions of linear regression and t-tests. This
transformation is recommended for data that are positively skewed (Bland & Altman, 1996).
Hypothesis 1. I fit a regression model to monies raised in fundraisers using main effects
for recognition group, internalization status, and symbolization status, as well as all two-way
interactions between the variables and the three-way interaction between the variables. I
predicted a positive three-way interaction between recognition, internalization, and
symbolization on monies raised. Specifically, I predicted that participants in the recognition
group who had high levels of internalization and symbolization would raise significantly more
money than participants who did not have these characteristics or were not in the recognition
group (see results for each hypothesis below). I fit a regression model to the amount of money
raised in fundraisers and found marginal evidence for this interaction, t(303) = -1.727, p = .086.
The change in the log of monies raised associated with the three-way interaction – the
intersection of being in the recognition group, being an internalizer, and being a symbolizer –
was -1.432 (95% CI = -3.070, 0.206), indicating that the interaction of these three-factors
decreased the amount of money raised, but not significantly so. No lower-order interactions or
main effects in the model were significant. The overall model did not significantly predict
monies raised, F(7,156) = 1.652, p = 0.125. Table 4 gives the table of regression coefficients and
p-values for this model. The three-way interaction was the only term in the model that warranted
further study, as there were no significant lower-order effects. The estimate for the interaction (β
= -1.432) suggests that participants in the recognition group who were high symbolizers and high
internalizers on average raised less money in their fundraisers than participants who were lower
with respect to symbolization and internalization and/or were not in the recognition group.
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The R2 of the model was .07, suggesting that 7% of the variance in money raised was
explained by the interaction of group, internalization, and symbolization. Inspection of
diagnostic plots for the model revealed no causes for concern, as there was no trend in model
residuals with respect to fitted values.
Table 4.
Summary of regression model on monies raised using three-way interaction term.
Term
Estimate
Standard Error
P-value
Recognition Group
-0.299
0.416
0.473
Internalization

-0.075

0.404

0.853

Symbolization

-0.324

0.458

0.481

Group*Internalization

0.291

0.554

0.600

Group*Symbolization

0.711

0.671

0.291

Internalization*Symbolization

0.254

0.592

0.668

Group*Internalization*Symbolization

-1.432

0.829

0.086

Hypothesis 2. I predicted a positive two-way interaction between recognition and
symbolization, such that participants in the recognition group who were high in symbolization
would raise significantly more money than participants who were low in symbolization or were
not in the recognition group. Referencing Table 4 and model, there was no significant
interaction between recognition group and symbolization (p = .291).
Hypothesis 3a. I predicted a positive correlation between symbolization and monies
raised, regardless of recognition group or internalization. Given the non-linear relationship
between the two variables, I computed Spearman’s rank-based correlation coefficient to test this
hypothesis. I found no significant correlation between symbolization and monies raised
(Spearman’s rho = -.129, p = .099.) This result suggests that there is no significant relationship
between level of moral symbolization status and fundraising amount in my sample.
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Hypothesis 3b. I predicted that participants in the recognition group would raise more
money than those in the control group, regardless of internalization or symbolization status. I
tested this hypothesis with an independent samples t-test using a logarithmic transformation for
monies raised due to positive skew in the data. I found no significant difference in monies raised
by recognition group, t(161) = 1.52, p = .131. The average amount of money raised (in dollars,
before transformation) was $197.82 in the control group and $227.27 in the recognition group.
This suggests that by itself, the recognition group and control group did not differ significantly in
terms of monies raised in the fundraisers.
Hypothesis 4. I predicted that participants in the recognition group would be significantly
more likely to begin a fundraising page than those in the control group. I fit a logistic regression
model to test this hypothesis and found no evidence that recognition group significantly altered
the likelihood of beginning a fundraiser (p = .375). The change in odds associated with being in
the recognition group was 0.815 (95% CI = 0.519, 1.279), indicating that being in the
recognition group did not affect the likelihood of beginning a fundraiser. In the model, 52.7
percent of started fundraisers were correctly predicted; with only this term included in the model,
all observations were predicted to have started a fundraiser, suggesting that recognition group did
not lead to a well-calibrated or predicted assessment of the likelihood of beginning a fundraiser.
This suggests that other factors may better predict the likelihood of beginning a fundraiser, such
as degree of personal investment with the disease, socio-economic status, etc.—at least for
samples resembling this one, a point to which I will return in the discussion. The model effect
size was small, with Nagelkerke’s R2 = 0.003.
Hypothesis 5. This hypothesis regards if a participant would begin a Facebook fundraiser,
(yes/no) not the amount of money raised among participants who did begin a fundraiser. I
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predicted a positive three-way interaction between recognition group, internalization, and
symbolization on the likelihood of beginning a successful fundraising page. I fit a logistic
regression model with the three-way interaction term and all lower-order terms to test this
hypothesis and found no significant relationship between the interaction and likelihood of
beginning a fundraiser (p = .820). The change in odds associated with the three-way interaction
term, specifically the intersection of being in the recognition group, being an internalizer, and
being a symbolizer, was 0.792 (95% CI = 0.108, 5.942). No other interaction or non-interaction
terms in the regression model were significantly associated with likelihood of beginning a
fundraiser. With all terms included in the model, 56.5 percent of cases were correctly predicted;
83.5 percent of started fundraisers were correctly predicted while only 26.1 percent of not-started
fundraisers were. The model effect size was small, with Nagelkerke’s R 2 = 0.039.
Hypothesis 6. I predicted a positive three-way interaction between recognition group,
internalization, and symbolization on monies raised, after controlling for perceived empathy. I fit
a regression model similar to that reported in Table 4 for Hypothesis 1, adding participants’
SITES empathy score as a control variable for perceived empathy. There was stronger evidence
for the three-way interaction term when controlling for empathy (p = .056), as summarized in
Table 5. However, the coefficient for the interaction was negative (β = -1.578), suggesting that
those in the recognition group and with high symbolization and internalization raised less on
average than those who did not have all these characteristics. Notably, empathy itself was
significantly and positively associated with monies raised (β = 0.619, p = .016). This coefficient
corresponds to an 85 percent increase in monies raised for participants self-identifying as
empathetic, compared to those who do not, while holding other factors constant in the model.
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Table 5.
Summary of regression model on monies raised using three-way interaction term, controlling for
empathy.
Term
Estimate
Standard Error p-value
Group
-0.384
0.411
0.352
Internalization

-0.422

0.422

0.319

Symbolization

-0.530

0.459

0.250

Empathy

0.619

0.254

0.016

Group*Internalization

0.487

0.551

0.378

Group*Symbolization

0.713

0.661

0.282

Internalization*Symbolization

0.445

0.588

0.450

Group*Internalization*Symbolization

-1.578

0.819

0.056

Discussion
This study investigated the relationship between recognition, moral identity and
charitable behavior, specifically volunteer fundraising for a national nonprofit organization.
Although the findings did not unfold as expected, this study resulted in a nontrivial amount of
money being raised for the Spina Bifida Foundation. That outcome is an important one, and hints
at the real-world significance of the topic, although the study yielded mostly null results
statistically.
Broadly, the results of my study indicated that the possibility of recognition, as well as
the moral identity traits (internalization and symbolization), did not affect fundraising behaviors,
by themselves or in interaction with each other. My primary hypothesis was a positive three-way
interaction between high internalization and high symbolization scores and being in the
recognition group I predicted that for those who were recognized, people with greater
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internalization and symbolization would raise more money in their Facebook fundraisers, relative
to those who were not recognized. By testing this hypothesis with a multiple regression model, I
found that this interaction effect did not exist in my sample, and neither did lower-order or main
effects for any of these variables. Further, there was no significant difference in money raised
between participants in the two recognition groups, regardless of internalization or symbolization
status (i.e., no significant main effect for recognition). Additionally, none of these variables, by
themselves or in interaction, significantly affected the likelihood of beginning a Facebook
fundraiser. The recognition versus no recognition conditions yielded similar results: Recognition
on a third-party website did not incentivize fundraising as predicted.
One significant finding I uncovered in my study was a positive association between selfreported empathy and monies raised. Specifically, I added perceived empathy, from the one-item
SITES scale (Konrath et al., 2018), as a control variable to the regression model I had previously
fit to assess the effects of its inclusion on estimates in my model. Highly empathetic people were
more likely to raise more money for their Facebook fundraiser, when holding other variables
constant. An increase of one unit on the SITES scale was associated with an approximately 85
percent increase in fundraising. This large effect is particularly notable given the brevity of the
SITES scale and has implications for fundraising practice.
Limitations and Further Directions
Two factors are of interest in explaining the null findings: the sample and the lack of
incentive that was provided by a type of recognition that has been proven to be successful in
other scenarios regarding fundraising (Grosenick, 2020). Regarding the latter, Hypothesis 3b was
not supported: recognition and control groups did not vary significantly in terms of money
raised. There also were no interactions involving recognition. In this sample of largely high
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internalizers (more than half had the maximum internalization score), the effect of recognition
was not an additional factor to motivate more successful fundraisers. In other, more varied
populations, there could be a significant effect of recognition (perhaps among very low
internalizers). There are larger effects of exogenous variables to this study (number of Facebook
friends), or that recognition by the fundraisers Facebook friends that they are starting a
fundraiser provides enough positive psychological benefit, and recognition on the Spina Bifida
Association website is superfluous to this. It seems that the recognition on Facebook to their
peers was adequate for these fundraisers. From a motivational perspective, Nadkarni and
Hofmann (2012) proposed sharing of personal information on Facebook was motivated by two
primary needs; to belong and for self-presentation (Lee, Im, & Taylor, 2008). Rosenbaum et al.
(2013) also found soliciting recognition from peers to be a significant goal of posting status
updates on Facebook.
It may be the case that the effect of recognition could have been larger if there was an
additional requirement for the fundraisers. For example, maybe the Spina Bifida Association
would only have recognized the fundraisers on their website if their fundraisers raised $500, etc.
so that the recognition seemed more special or rare. Scarcity, or in this case, the perception of
exclusivity, has been shown to be a strong motivator of behavior by increasing perceived value
or desirability (Cialdini, 1993).
Regarding an individual participant’s number of Facebook friends: ideally, I would have
liked to control for number of Facebook friends in all models, for two reasons. First and most
obviously, a greater number of Facebook friends means there would be more potential donors for
the fundraiser to draw from. As less obvious reason is that having more friends means there are
potentially more people to recognize the fundraiser, through sharing it on their own pages.
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However, due to limitations in collecting individuals’ information on the Facebook platform, it
was not possible to gather data on participants’ number of Facebook friends.
Another explanation for the null result may be found with my sample. It was my belief
that subjects recruited from the membership of a healthcare nonprofit would be particularly well
suited for this study. Spina bifida is a condition that can affect anyone, regardless of age, sex,
gender, ethnicity, etc. I assumed that members of this type of organization (with a health-related
mission) would include a heterogeneous pool with regards to moral identity centrality when
contrasted with the membership of a social welfare organization (e.g., The Southern Poverty Law
Center) or other nonprofits whose members are self-selected, and therefore may be more skewed
as a group to be high in moral identity internalization. However, that may not have been the case.
When comparing the sample means for moral identity internalization and symbolization
in the Winterich, et. al. (2013) study of the influence of recognition on charitable behavior, we
see that the Spina Bifida Association sample is actually very similar. Tables 6 and 7 show the
mean moral identity scores for all participants in my study, those in the recognition group, and
the control group for all participants and only those participants beginning a Facebook
fundraiser, respectively.
Table 6.
Mean moral identity scores among all participants.
Both groups
Recognition group

Control group

Internalization

M = 6.63, SD = 2.26

M = 6.62, SD = 2.31

M = 6.64, SD = 2.21

Symbolization

M = 5.37, SD = 3.60

M = 5.45, SD = 3.50

M = 3.12, SD = 3.71
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Table 7.
Mean moral identity scores among participants starting a Facebook fundraiser.
Both groups
Recognition group
Control group
Internalization

M = 6.69, SD = 2.21

M = 6.70, SD = 2.28

M = 6.69, SD = 1.89

Symbolization

M = 5.36, SD = 3.40

M = 5.30, SD = 3.56

M = 5.42, SD = 3.22

In the Winterich et. al. (2013) study, the mean for internalization (M = 6.17, SD = .96)
was significantly higher than that for symbolization (M = 4.17, SD = 1.13). In addition, in their
sample, the mean for internalization is very high at an absolute level, more than 6 on a 7-point
scale, with approximately 30% of that sample scoring 7 on a seven-point scale. These means
were consistent with those obtained in the scale development (Aquino & Reed, 2002) and in
subsequent research (Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino et al., 2011; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007;
Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007; Skarlicki et al., 2008).
Winterich et. al. (2013) found that recognition increases charitable behavior among
participants characterized by high moral identity symbolization and low moral identity
internalization. These individuals share donation activity to enhance or maintain a positive social
image (Choi & Winterich, 2013; Grant & Mayer, 2009). The means for my sample’s
internalization scores shown in Tables 6 and 7 were consistently higher than in the Winterich, et.
al. study. That leads to two possible conclusions: first, that the high ceiling that was evident in
the internalization scores across all groups negated the effect of recognition for all participants.
Such ceiling effects were present across the entire sample, as well as pertinent comparisons of
groups within the sample. Table 8 displays the results of independent samples t-tests comparing
the moral identity concepts by recognition group, for participants who started a fundraiser, as
well as for all participants who completed questionnaires. All these tests had null findings,
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indicating that the high scores and associated ceiling effects were present across groups. The
second involves the type of recognition that was offered. Recognition by the Spina Bifida
Association may not have been salient enough to influence participants’ fundraising behavior.
Again, this suggests that recognition by the friends of the person initiating the fundraiser on
Facebook provides enough positive psychological benefit.
Table 8.
Comparison of moral identity concepts with t-tests.
Sample
Moral Identity Concept
Entire
Internalization

Those who started fundraiser

T-value
0.275

DF
289

P-value
0.784

Symbolization

-1.436

275

0.152

Internalization

-0.022

162

0.982

Symbolization

0.748

160

0.455

With regards to why there was no effect of internalization and symbolization on money
raised, one partial reason may be that there was not much variation in the sample with respect to
symbolization and particularly internalization. Most respondents scored high on both measures.
There could have been an effect of one of these variables/concepts in another population. So
maybe this could be true in younger populations, people with less money or fundraising
experience, etc.
A final issue that should be mentioned is the question of the validity of the Moral Identity
Scale itself, and particularly as applied to self-report data. In my sample, the correlation between
the two subscales, internalization and symbolization, is 0.17 for those who started a fundraiser,
and 0.13 for the entire sample, regardless of whether they started a fundraiser. Very low
correlations such as these cast doubt on any single superordinate construct of moral identity
being measured in my sample. While a very high correlation between the subscales is also
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undesirable from the perspective of statistical efficiency, as this could indicate the subscales
were measuring the same construct, the above correlations still seem low, suggesting that the
construct validity of the scale may be suspect.
It seems unlikely that participants would score too low on the MIS, perhaps because of
the impact of social desirability on their responses. Participants may feel a social pressure to
respond in a certain way to MIS questions, as it has been found that both the internalization (r =
.18) and symbolization (r = .26) subscales of the MIS are associated with impression
management (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Not surprisingly then, Aquino and Reed (study 5, 2002)
reported extremely high means coupled with very low standard deviations for the average score
for each of the five internalization questions (M = 4.58, SD = 0.42) and each of the five
symbolization questions (M = 3.12, SD = 0.69) (note that this version of the MIS used 5-point
Likert scales). Other researchers have reported similar findings with the scale. Hall and
Derryberry (2010) reported the same pattern of high means and low standard deviations for
participants in their study’s low racial prejudice group, with average internalization (M = 24.03,
SD = 1.24) and symbolization (M = 18.48, SD = 3.42) scores also measured on a 5-point scale.
As was the case in my research, the internalization dimension may be more likely to
exhibit both higher scores and lower variability. A skewness analysis of the Hall and Derryberry
(2010) data showed the internalization scores to be highly negatively skewed, indicating that the
majority of scores were high, and that there was little variability in the way the questions were
answered. I have noted above that the previously mentioned studies utilized a 5-point Likert
scale, unlike my research, which used a 7-point scale (the MIS was normed using a 7-point
scale). What type of scale is used is dependent on the researcher’s preference. The limited
variability that is seen may be due in some part to the inconsistency in measurement. A narrower
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range of scores would likely result in a higher likelihood of ceiling and floor effects, but to what
extent it is difficult to determine.
Discussion of the associations between moral identity subscales should also consider the
broader associations between these scores and moral behavior identified in the literature. Hertz
and Krettenauer (2016) conducted a meta-analysis of 111 studies that examined the relationship
between moral identity and moral behavior. Sixty-five percent of the studies in the meta-analysis
utilized Aquino and Reed’s Moral Identity Scale. Overall, across all analyzed studies, there was
a significant positive correlation between moral identity and moral behavior (random effects
model, r = .22, p < .01, 95% CI [.19, .25]). However, the authors note that the predictive effect
was small to moderate, approximating the average effect size found in most social psychological
research. The magnitude of this correlation falls below the common thresholds for moderate
(0.30) and large (0.50) effect sizes established by Cohen (Cohen, 1988). Their conclusion was
that moral identity does not strongly predict moral behavior. Further, the studies that were based
on explicit self-report data yielded the strongest effect sizes, suggesting that social desirability
biases inflate the relationship between moral identity and behavior. This is consistent with the
high scores and low variability for the MIS generally, which was seen in my sample.
Implications
Regarding the addition of empathy to the model in Hypothesis 6, and its effect—it is
notable that perceived empathy (simply a one-question instrument, how does the statement “I am
an empathetic person” describe you) is a significant term in the model, and decisively, after no
other significant findings before this point. However, this shouldn’t be too surprising, given the
extensive body of research demonstrating the strong relationship between empathy and prosocial
behavior (Xiao et al., 2021). There are a number of ways in which perceived empathy could
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positively affect monies raised. For example, in the creation of the Facebook fundraiser, people
perceiving themselves as empathetic may include more detailed and persuasive text in the
fundraiser description, or may share their fundraiser in more ways, in building on their empathy.
People who describe themselves as being less empathetic may do this to a lesser extent, instead
adopting a “set-it-and-forget-it” attitude towards the fundraiser.
We cannot know for sure if the finding regarding empathy and fundraising wasn’t
because of the sample consisting of supporters of the Spina Bifida Association. Still, in the last
thirty years, a substantial number of studies that propose empathy as an explanation for prosocial
behavior have been published (Verhaert & Van den Poel, 2011). The empathy–altruism
hypothesis addresses the distinction between empathic concern and personal distress and
differentiates altruistically versus egoistically motivated behavior (Batson, 2010). This
hypothesis further states that being confronted with others in need may increase levels of
empathic concern or personal distress. Of those in my sample, 52 percent reported that they had
themselves been diagnosed with spina bifida, and an additional 32 percent had an immediate
family member diagnosed with spina bifida. Not surprisingly, high charity involvement (Bennett
& Gabriel, 2000) has been found to occur when a particular issue has either personal relevance,
inherent interest or intrinsic importance to the supporter. This factor—the proximity to those in
need or being in need oneself—may have motivated their altruism as reflected by fundraising.
This would also explain the greater than expected number of participants who started successful
Facebook fundraisers.
Conclusion
“Social fundraising,” collecting charitable donations using volunteer fundraisers on social
platforms, is a relatively new fundraising venue for nonprofits. Nonprofit fundraising can be
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conceptualized as having three “waves” (Losquadro, 2022). The first wave took place through
direct mail and handwritten checks. The second wave was through the internet and online
fundraising pages on nonprofit websites. In just the last seven years a third shift in giving
developed, the third wave — in-channel engagement and social fundraising tactics. Between
crowdfunding campaigns on Twitter, Facebook fundraisers and TikTok philanthropy, donors
give to nonprofits through the channels that they’re already spending significant time on —
social networks. Through the first two waves, nonprofits have used recognition as a tool to
motivate donations and fundraising. They have applied the same recognition strategies for
motivating supporters in the third wave, fundraising on social networks. The null findings in the
present research suggest that the type of recognition which has been applied successfully in the
first two waves (VanHuss & Fulton, 2017) will not result in more funds being raised through
Facebook fundraisers and other social networks which constitute the third wave.
The nonprofit industry is heavily invested in the types of recognition that are effective in
the offline environment. Many nonprofits have conducted correlational studies (Grosenick, 2020)
which have shown that the application of recognition was related to higher fundraising. Elaborate
and expensive recognition product systems have been implemented by nonprofits based on this
belief. A conservative level of expense spent on recognition of supporters is 3 percent of total
monies raised. The American Cancer Society Relay for Life fundraising program spent, at its
high mark, over $10,000,000 annually on recognition programs for fundraising volunteers.
Nonprofits are translating how they have applied recognition in the past into the online, social
fundraising environment. This research suggests that approach will not be successful, resulting in
wasted money that could instead be put towards their missions.
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The act of online sharing is a strategy for impression formation. When negative social
consequences, such as embarrassment, result from an act of sharing, the action is avoided
(Campbell & Goodstein, 2001). Individuals who started Facebook (birthday) fundraisers have
been interviewed, including people who successfully hit their fundraising goals as well as those
who did not (Berman, 2020). A majority of fundraisers who hit their goal said they were likely to
launch another birthday fundraiser the following year for the same organization. Most
fundraisers who did not hit their goal said they were unlikely to launch another birthday
fundraiser because they were embarrassed. The source of this embarrassment was not hitting the
goal they publicly shared with their network of friends. Interestingly, that did not mean that they
had less affinity for the organization. They still wanted to be a supporter, just in a less public
way. This is but one example of the important real-world implications of understanding how and
why recognition is effective—or not—in social fundraising settings.

INTERACTION OF MI AND RECOGNITION ON FUNDRAISING

49

References
Aquino, K., Freeman, D., Reed, A., Lim, V. K. G., & Felps, W. (2009). Testing a SocialCognitive Model of Moral Behavior: The Interactive Influence of Situations and Moral
Identity Centrality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(1), 123-141.
doi:10.1037/a0015406
Aquino, K., McFerran, B., & Laven, M. (2011). Moral Identity and the Experience of Moral
Elevation in Response to Acts of Uncommon Goodness. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 100(4), 703-718. doi:10.1037/a0022540
Aquino, K., & Reed, A. (2002). The Self-Importance of Moral Identity. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 83(6), 1423-1440. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1423
Bargh, J. A. (2006). What have we been priming all these years? On the development,
mechanisms, and ecology of nonconscious social behavior. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 36(2), 147-168. doi:10.1002/ejsp.336
Batson, C. D. (2010). Altruism. In (pp. 70-71).
Baumeister, R. F. (1998). The interface between intrapsychic and interpersonal processes:
Cognition, emotion, and self as adaptations to other people. In (pp. 201-242).
Washington: American Psychological Association.
Baumeister, R. F., Heatherton, T. F., & Tice, D. M. (1993). When Ego Threats Lead to SelfRegulation Failure: Negative Consequences of High Self-Esteem. Journal of personality
and social psychology, 64(1), 141-156. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.64.1.141
Bennett, R., & Gabriel, H. (2000). Charity affiliation as a determinant of product purchase
decisions. The journal of product & brand management, 9(4), 255-270.
doi:10.1108/10610420010344059

INTERACTION OF MI AND RECOGNITION ON FUNDRAISING

50

Berman, J. (2020). Unpublished internal document, Good United.
Bland, J. M., & Altman, D. G. (1996). Measurement Error And Correlation Coefficients. BMJ :
British Medical Journal, 313(7048), 41-42.
Blasi, A. (1980). Bridging moral cognition and moral action: A critical review of the literature.
Psychological Bulletin, 88(1), 1-45. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.88.1.1
Blasi, A. (1983). Moral cognition and moral action: A theoretical perspective. Developmental
Review, 3, 178-210.
Blasi, A. (1984). Moral identity: Its role in moral functioning. In J. G. W. Kurtines (Ed.),
Morality, moral behavior and moral development (pp. 128-139). NY: Wiley.
Blasi, A. (1999). Emotions and Moral Motivation. Journal for the theory of social behaviour,
29(1), 1-19. doi:10.1111/1468-5914.00088
Boegershausen, J., Aquino, K., & Reed, A. (2015). Moral identity. Current Opinion in
Psychology, 6(C), 162-166. doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.07.017
Campbell, M. C., & Goodstein, R. C. (2001). The Moderating Effect of Perceived Risk on
Consumers’ Evaluations of Product Incongruity: Preference for the Norm. The Journal of
consumer research, 28(3), 439-449. doi:10.1086/323731
Carr, D. a. (2014). Experience and history : phenomenological perspectives on the historical
world: New York, NY : Oxford University Press.
Choi, W. J., & Winterich, K. P. (2013). Can Brands Move In from the Outside? How Moral
Identity Enhances Out-Group Brand Attitudes. Journal of Marketing, 77(2), 96-111.
doi:10.1509/jm.11.0544
Cialdini, R. B. (1993). Influence : the psychology of persuasion (Rev. ed.. ed.). New York: New
York : Morrow.

INTERACTION OF MI AND RECOGNITION ON FUNDRAISING

51

Clary, E. G., & Mark, S. (1999). The Motivations to Volunteer: Theoretical and Practical
Considerations. Curr Dir Psychol Sci, 8(5), 156-159. doi:10.1111/1467-8721.00037
Clary, E. G., & Orenstein, L. (1991). The Amount and Effectiveness of Help: The Relationship
of Motives and Abilities to Helping Behavior. Personality & social psychology bulletin,
17(1), 58-64. doi:10.1177/0146167291171009
Clary, E. G., & Snyder, M. (1999). The Motivations to Volunteer: Theoretical and Practical
Considerations. Current directions in psychological science : a journal of the American
Psychological Society, 8(5), 156-159. doi:10.1111/1467-8721.00037
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, N.J:
L. Erlbaum Associates.
Cohen, T. R., & Morse, L. (2014). Moral character: What it is and what it does. Research in
organizational behavior, 34, 43-61. doi:10.1016/j.riob.2014.08.003
Cunningham, G. K. (1986). Educational and psychological measurement. New York:
Macmillan.
Darcia, Narv e., & Daniel, K. L. (2004). Moral development, self, and identity. Mahwah, NJ u.a:
Mahwah, NJ u.a: Erlbaum.
Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a
multidimensional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44(1), 113126. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.44.1.113
Davis, M. H., Mitchell, K. V., Hall, J. A., Lothert, J., Snapp, T., & Meyer, M. (1999). Empathy,
Expectations, and Situational Preferences: Personality Influences on the Decision to
Participate in Volunteer Helping Behaviors. Journal of personality, 67(3), 469-503.
doi:10.1111/1467-6494.00062

INTERACTION OF MI AND RECOGNITION ON FUNDRAISING

52

Eisenberg, N. (2000). Emotion, regulation, and moral development. Annual review of
psychology, 51(1), 665-697. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.51.1.665
Eisenberg, N., & Miller, P. A. (1987). The Relation of Empathy to Prosocial and Related
Behaviors. Psychological Bulletin, 101(1), 91-119. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.101.1.91
Erikson, E. H. (1964). Childhood and society (2d ed., rev. and enl.. ed.). New York: New York,
Norton.
Farrelly, D., & Bennett, M. (2018). Empathy leads to increased online charitable behaviour when
time is the currency. Journal of community & applied social psychology, 28(1), 42-46.
doi:10.1002/casp.2339
Fisher, R. J., & Ackerman, D. (1998). The Effects of Recognition and Group Need on
Volunteerism: A Social Norm Perspective. Journal of Consumer Research, 25(3), 262275. doi:10.1086/209538
Frank Chapman, S. (1898). An Objective Study of Some Moral Judgments. The American
journal of psychology, 9(2), 198-234. doi:10.2307/1411759
Frimer, J. A., & Walker, L. J. (2008). Towards a new paradigm of moral personhood. Journal of
moral education, 37(3), 333-356. doi:10.1080/03057240802227494
Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011). Mapping the
Moral Domain. J Pers Soc Psychol, 101(2), 366-385. doi:10.1037/a0021847
Grant, A. (2012). Giving Time, Time After Time: Work Design and Sustained Employee
Participation in Corporate Volunteering. Academy of Management. The Academy of
Management Review, 37(4), 589-615.

INTERACTION OF MI AND RECOGNITION ON FUNDRAISING
Grant, A. M., & Mayer, D. M. (2009). Good Soldiers and Good Actors: Prosocial and
Impression Management Motives as Interactive Predictors of Affiliative Citizenship
Behaviors. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94(4), 900-912. doi:10.1037/a0013770
Gray, K. J., & Graham, J. (2018). Atlas of moral psychology. New York, NY: The Guilford
Press.
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An
fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment. Science (American
Association for the Advancement of Science), 293(5537), 2105-2108.
doi:10.1126/science.1062872
Grosenick, R. (2020). Behavioral Trends Benchmark Report Across the Peer-to-Peer Industry.
Habashi, M. M., Graziano, W. G., & Hoover, A. E. (2016). Searching for the Prosocial
Personality: A Big Five Approach to Linking Personality and Prosocial Behavior.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 42(9), 1177-1192.
doi:10.1177/0146167216652859
Haidt, J. (2001). The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to
Moral Judgment. Psychological review, 108(4), 814-834. doi:10.1037/0033295X.108.4.814
Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007). When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral
Intuitions that Liberals may not Recognize. Social justice research, 20(1), 98-116.
doi:10.1007/s11211-007-0034-z
Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2004). Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate
Culturally Variable Virtues. Daedalus (Cambridge, Mass.), 133(4), 55-66.
doi:10.1162/0011526042365555

53

INTERACTION OF MI AND RECOGNITION ON FUNDRAISING

54

Hall, B., & Derryberry, W. P. (2010). Are Aversive Racists Distinguishable From Those With
High Explicit Racial Prejudice? Beliefs and values, 2(2), 138-153. doi:10.1891/19420617.2.2.138
Harbaugh, W. T. (1998). The Prestige Motive for Making Charitable Transfers. The American
Economic Review, 88(2), 277-282.
Hardy, S. A., & Carlo, G. (2005). Identity as a Source of Moral Motivation. Human
Development, 48(4), 232-256. doi:10.1159/000086859
Harter, S. (1999). The construction of the self : a developmental perspective. New York: New
York : Guilford Press.
Hartshorne, H., & May, M. A. (1930). A Summary of the Work of the Character Education
Inquiry. Religious education, 25(7), 607-619. doi:10.1080/0034408300250702
Hertz, S. G., & Krettenauer, T. (2016). Does moral identity effectively predict moral behavior?:
A meta-analysis. Review of General Psychology, 20(2), 129-140.
doi:10.1037/gpr0000062
Hessekiel, D. (2019). At $2 Billion Raised, Facebook Fundraising Can't Be Ignored By
Nonprofits. Forbes.
Hoffman, M. L. (1970). Conscience, Personality, and Socialization Techniques. Human
Development, 13(2), 90-126. doi:10.1159/000270884
Hoffman, M. L. (2001). Toward a comprehensive empathy-based theory of prosocial moral
development: American Psychological Association.
Ilies, R., Scott, B. A., & Judge, T. A. (2006). The Interactive Effects of Personal Traits and
Experienced States on Intraindividual Patterns of Citizenship Behavior. The Academy of
Management Journal, 49(3), 561-575. doi:10.5465/AMJ.2006.21794672

INTERACTION OF MI AND RECOGNITION ON FUNDRAISING

55

James, W. (2011). Psychology. New York, NY: New York, NY Barnes & Noble Digital Library.
Jennings, P., Mitchell, M., & Hannah, S. (2015). The moral self: A review and integration of the
literature. In (Vol. 36, pp. S104). Chichester: Wiley Periodicals Inc.
Jiao, J., Wang, J., & Maheswaran, D. (2018). Can Lonely People Behave Morally? The Joint
Influence of Loneliness and Empathy on Moral Identity. Journal of consumer
psychology, 28(4), 597-611. doi:10.1002/jcpy.1040
John, W., & Marc, M. (1997). Who Cares? Toward an Integrated Theory of Volunteer Work.
American sociological review, 62(5), 694-713. doi:10.2307/2657355
Joireman, J., Kamdar, D., Daniels, D., & Duell, B. (2006). Good Citizens to the End? It
Depends: Empathy and Concern With Future Consequences Moderate the Impact of a
Short-Term Time Horizon on Organizational Citizenship Behaviors. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 91(6), 1307-1320. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.91.6.1307
Khang, H., & Jeong, I. (2016). Perceived self and behavioral traits as antecedents of an online
empathic experience and prosocial behavior: Evidence from South Korea. Computers in
human behavior, 64, 888-897. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2016.08.010
Knight, T. (2015). A psychometric examination of prosocial behavior across cultural contexts. In
T. L. Hughes, G. Kanyongo, & K. McGoey (Eds.): ProQuest Dissertations Publishing.
Kohlberg, L. (1984). The psychology of moral development : the nature and validity of moral
stages (1st ed.. ed.). San Francisco: San Francisco : Harper & Row.
Konrath, S., Meier, B. P., & Bushman, B. J. (2018). Development and validation of the single
item trait empathy scale (SITES). Journal of research in personality, 73, 111-122.
doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2017.11.009

INTERACTION OF MI AND RECOGNITION ON FUNDRAISING

56

Kotler, P. (2005). Corporate social responsibility : doing the most good for your company and
your cause. Hoboken, N.J.: Hoboken, N.J. : Wiley.
Krettenauer, T., Murua, L. A., & Jia, F. (2016). Age-Related Differences in Moral Identity
Across Adulthood. Developmental Psychology, 52(6), 972-984. doi:10.1037/dev0000127
Lapsley, D. K., & Narvaez, D. (2004). Moral development, self, and identity. In (Vol. 39, pp.
624-625). SAN DIEGO: LIBRA PUBLISHERS INC.
Leary, M. R., & Tangney, J. P. (2012). Handbook of self and identity (2nd ed.). New York:
Guilford Press.
Leboeuf, R. A., Shafir, E., & Bayuk, J. B. (2010). The conflicting choices of alternating selves.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 111(1), 48-61.
doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2009.08.004
Lee, D.-H., Im, S., & Taylor, C. R. (2008). Voluntary self-disclosure of information on the
Internet: A multimethod study of the motivations and consequences of disclosing
information on blogs. Psychology & marketing, 25(7), 692-710. doi:10.1002/mar.20232
Leiberg, S., Klimecki, O., & Singer, T. (2011). Short-Term Compassion Training Increases
Prosocial Behavior in a Newly Developed Prosocial Game. PloS one, 6(3), e17798e17798. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017798
Leng, J., Sun, P., Ma, B., Zhang, S., & Guo, Q. (2020). Bridging Personality and Online
Prosocial Behavior: The Roles of Empathy, Moral Identity, and Social Self-Efficacy.
Frontiers in psychology, 11, 575053-575053. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.575053
Losquadro, C. (2022). Two Arguments for Why Nonprofits Should Stay on Facebook. NonProfit
PRO.

INTERACTION OF MI AND RECOGNITION ON FUNDRAISING

57

Masten, C. L., Morelli, S. A., & Eisenberger, N. I. (2011). An fMRI investigation of empathy for
‘social pain’ and subsequent prosocial behavior. NeuroImage (Orlando, Fla.), 55(1), 381388. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.11.060
Mazzoni, G., & Nelson, T. O. (1998). Metacognition and cognitive neuropsychology :
monitoring and control processes. Mahwah, N.J.: Mahwah, N.J. : L. Erlbaum.
Meglino, B. M., & Korsgaard, M. A. (2004). Considering Rational Self-Interest as a Disposition:
Organizational Implications of Other Orientation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89(6),
946-959. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.89.6.946
Moore, S. E. H. (2008). Ribbon culture : charity, compassion, and public awareness.
Bastingstoke [England] ; New York: Bastingstoke England ; New York : Palgrave
Macmillan.
Nadkarni, A., & Hofmann, S. G. (2012). Why do people use Facebook? Personality and
individual differences, 52(3), 243-249. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2011.11.007
Omoto, A. M., & Snyder, M. (1995). Sustained Helping Without Obligation: Motivation,
Longevity of Service, and Perceived Attitude Change Among AIDS Volunteers. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 68(4), 671-686. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.68.4.671
Omoto, A. M., & Snyder, M. (2002). Considerations of Community: The Context and Process of
Volunteerism. The American behavioral scientist (Beverly Hills), 45(5), 846-867.
doi:10.1177/0002764202045005007
Organ, D., & Ryan, K. (1995). A meta-analytic review of attitudinal and dispositional predictors
of organizational citizenship behavior. Personnel Psychology, 48(4), 775.
doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.1995.tb01781.x

INTERACTION OF MI AND RECOGNITION ON FUNDRAISING

58

Penner, L. A., Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., & Schroeder, D. A. (2005). Prosocial Behavior:
Multilevel Perspectives. 56, 365-392. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070141
Penner, L. A., & Finkelstein, M. A. (1998). Dispositional and Structural Determinants of
Volunteerism. Journal of personality and social psychology, 74(2), 525-537.
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.2.525
Penner, L. A., Midili, A. R., & Kegelmeyer, J. (1997). Beyond Job Attitudes: A Personality and
Social Psychology Perspective on the Causes of Organizational Citizenship Behavior.
Human performance, 10(2), 111-131. doi:10.1207/s15327043hup1002_4
Peyrot, A. (2019). Facebook Fundraisers Tips, Trends, and Benchmark Data.
Price Tangney, J., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. J. (2007). Moral emotions and moral behavior.
Annu Rev Psychol, 58(1), 345-372. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070145
Reed, A., Aquino, K., & Levy, E. (2007). Moral Identity and Judgments of Charitable Behaviors.
Journal of marketing, 71(1), 178-193. doi:10.1509/jmkg.71.1.178
Reed, A., & Aquino, K. F. (2003). Moral Identity and the Expanding Circle of Moral Regard
Toward Out-Groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84(6), 1270-1286.
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.84.6.1270
Reed, P. B., & Selbee, K. L. (2001). Volunteering and giving: A regional perspective.(survey of
volunteerism in Canada). Canadian social trends(63), 16.
Reynolds, S. J., & Ceranic, T. L. (2007). The Effects of Moral Judgment and Moral Identity on
Moral Behavior: An Empirical Examination of the Moral Individual. Journal of applied
psychology, 92(6), 1610-1624. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.92.6.1610
Russell, G. K., & Doris, J. M. (2008). Knowledge by Indifference. Australasian journal of
philosophy, 86(3), 429-437. doi:10.1080/00048400802001996

INTERACTION OF MI AND RECOGNITION ON FUNDRAISING

59

S. Rosenbaum, M., Massiah, C., & Wozniak, R. (2013). An exploratory analysis of social
commonalities and subjective discounts. International journal of retail & distribution
management, 41(9), 671-687. doi:10.1108/IJRDM-03-2012-0032
Shao, R., Aquino, K., & Freeman, D. (2008). BEYOND MORAL REASONING: A REVIEW
OF MORAL IDENTITY RESEARCH AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR BUSINESS
ETHICS. Business Ethics Quarterly, 18(4), 513. doi:10.5840/beq200818436
Skarlicki, D. P., Van Jaarsveld, D. D., & Walker, D. D. (2008). Getting Even for Customer
Mistreatment: The Role of Moral Identity in the Relationship Between Customer
Interpersonal Injustice and Employee Sabotage. Journal of Applied Psychology, 93(6),
1335-1347. doi:10.1037/a0012704
VanHuss, K., & Fulton, O. (2017). Dollar Dash: The Behavioral Economics of Peer-to-Peer
Fundraising. Richmond, VA: Turnkey.
Verhaert, G. A., & Van den Poel, D. (2011). Empathy as added value in predicting donation
behavior. Journal of business research, 64(12), 1288-1295.
doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2010.12.024
Wendorf, C. A. (2001). HISTORY OF AMERICAN MORALITY RESEARCH, 1894-1932.
History of psychology, 4(3), 272-288. doi:10.1037/1093-4510.4.3.272
Winterich, K., Mittal, V., & Aquino, K. (2013). When Does Recognition Increase Charitable
Behavior? Toward a Moral Identity-Based Model. Journal of Marketing, 77(3), 121.
doi:10.1509/jm.11.0477
Wymer, W. (2001). Volunteer service as symbolic consumption: Gender and occupational
differences in volunteering. American Marketing Association. Conference Proceedings,
12, 135.

INTERACTION OF MI AND RECOGNITION ON FUNDRAISING

60

Xiao, W., Lin, X., Li, X., Xu, X., Guo, H., Sun, B., & Jiang, H. (2021). The Influence of
Emotion and Empathy on Decisions to Help Others. SAGE open, 11(2),
215824402110145. doi:10.1177/21582440211014513
Zhou, Q., Eisenberg, N., Losoya, S. H., Fabes, R. A., Reiser, M., Guthrie, I. K., . . . Shepard, S.
A. (2002). The Relations of Parental Warmth and Positive Expressiveness to Childrens
Empathy-Related Responding and Social Functioning: A Longitudinal Study. Child
development, 73(3), 893-915. doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00446

INTERACTION OF MI AND RECOGNITION ON FUNDRAISING

61

Appendix 1 – Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale (MIS)
Aquino and Reed’s (2002) Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale and Instructions

Listed alphabetically below are some characteristics that might describe a person:
Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Hardworking, Helpful, Honest, Kind
The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment,
visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person
would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like,
answer the following questions using the scale below.
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree, 5 =
somewhat agree, 6 = agree, 7 = strongly agree

1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics.
2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am.
3. I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics.
4. I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics.
5. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as having these
characteristics.
6. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these characteristics.
7. Having these characteristics is not really important to me.
8. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my membership in
certain organizations.
9. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these
characteristics.
10. I strongly desire to have these characteristics.
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Appendix 2 – Solicitation Message
Solicitation email to participate in survey

Subject: We want to know more about YOU!
Dear (FIRSTNAME),
Thank you for being part of the Spina Bifida Association family. We are working with
researchers at Virginia Commonwealth University in order to learn more about the supporters
who make up our community.
Please take just a few minutes to answer a brief survey. All information will be kept confidential.
Many thanks – click on this link that will take you to the survey. (LINK)
Sincerely,
Sara Struwe
President & CEO
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Appendix 3 – Single Item Trait Empathy Scale (SITES)
The Single Item Trait Empathy Scale (SITES) consists of a single item:
To what extent does the following statement describe you: "I am an empathetic person," rated
using a scale that ranges from 1 = Not very true of me to 5 = Very true of me.
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Appendix 4 – Survey Demographic Items

First Name
Last Name
Email
Age
< 20
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70+
Gender
M
F
Non-Binary
Other/prefer not to answer
Relationship to Spina Bifida
Diagnosed with spina bifida
Immediate family member diagnosed
Relative diagnosed
Friend diagnosed
Other
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